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Abstract The Academic Labor Market in France can be viewed as a constrained
Stable Marriage problem, pairing universities and candidates according to their (eli-
tist) preferences. A Multi-Agent based model, calibrated after the empirical evi-
dence, is used to investigate how universities can recruit the best candidates with
high confidence. Extensive simulations suggest that universities can be divided in
four categories: top and medium universities have no difficulty in attracting the can-
didates they have selected, contrarily to good and bad universities. In this paper, a
learning mechanism is presented: universities are allowed to tune their expectations
depending on whether they did succeed to attract candidates in the previous recruit-
ment rounds. The impact of over/under estimations is analyzed with respect to the
hiring efficiency and quality.
1 Introduction
National academic labor markets (ALMs) are strongly influenced by the culture and
history of the country [1]. The French system examined in this paper reflects an
egalitarian tradition; the hiring process globally aggregates the preferences of uni-
versities and candidates using a Stable Marriage-like algorithm [2]. Due to admin-
istrative constraints (limited size of the short list), this centralized procedure might
entail some hiring inefficiencies, where good universities might select top candi-
dates, who will ultimately prefer better universities. Universities might therefore
use less elitist and more secure recruitment strategies. The goal of this paper is to
examine how strategies based on raising/lowering the university expectations might
improve their hiring efficiency. In an earlier study of the French ALM [3], a Multi-
Agent (MA) simulation framework has been proposed to assess the hiring rate and
the quality of the recruitment process. In this paper, this framework is extended, al-
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lowing universities to adjust their selectivity depending on their hiring success in the
previous steps. The efficiency of the considered strategies is discussed with respect
to the university position (relatively to the set of universities).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews and discusses rel-
evant work. The French academic labor market (ALM) is presented in section 3.
Section 4 describes the MA-based model. Section 5 discusses the lessons learned
from extensive simulations conducted with this model, and the paper concludes with
some perspectives for further research.
2 Related work
Centralized (labor) markets are based on the preferences of sellers (here, the can-
didates) and buyers (the universities). The combinatorial optimization problem of
building an optimal pairing, referred to as Stable Marriage problem, has been ex-
tensively investigated since Gale & Shapley pioneering work [2]. The French min-
istry actually uses a variant of the Stable Marriage algorithm (akin [4]) to compute
an optimal assignment of candidates to universities. Importantly, the procedure is
shown to be truthful, in the sense that no agent could improve its outcome by lying
about its preferences [5]. The optimality and truthfulness properties however only
hold in an idealized setting (rational agents, unbounded shortlists).
The French academic labor market has more specifically been studied by [1] in
a sociological perspective. This work focuses on organizational, societal and cogni-
tive aspects; the professional efficiency, the university organization and department
cohesiveness, and the quality assessment are related to the hiring process. The Local
Hiring phenomenon has been investigated in a specific area by [6], empirically mea-
suring how the proximity between the PhD jury of a candidate and the jury of highly
competitive national examinations, is correlated with the probability of success of
the candidate.
On the computational side, a variety of social and economical problems have
been investigated using multi-agent systems (MAs) [7, 8]. MAs have demonstrated
their ability to both represent (cognitive) agents and constrained interaction rules,
and provide insights into the dynamics of the system. More generally, MAs are
increasingly being considered as a flexible and versatile modelling framework, en-
abling positive and normative investigations of phenomena out of reach of analytical
studies, and supported by efficient programming environments (e.g., ModulEco [9]
and RePast [10]). In an earlier work [3], a MAS has been proposed to model the
French ALM and study the local hiring problem; interestingly, local hiring (see be-
low) was shown to be an efficient hiring strategy (as opposed to, a “bad university
habit”) in some settings.
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3 The French Academic Labor Market
This section describes the French academic hiring process and the available ground
truth.
3.1 The hiring process
• The list of all open positions in all universities is published by the State depart-
ment. Every PhD1 is free to apply to any such position; the number of applications
is not restricted.
• In each university, for each position, a jury is designated, selects candidates and
interviews the selected candidates.
• Every selected candidate goes to every interview (except for conflicting schedules
or if he has been formerly top-listed in a University he prefers).
• For each position, the jury publishes a shortlist of at most five names, selected
among the interviewed candidates.
• Each candidate is informed of the positions he has been shortlisted for, together
with his rank; he symmetrically ranks all positions (no length constraint) according
to his preferences.
• All university shortlists and candidate ranking lists are sent to the ministry; a stable
marriage like algorithm is used to compute the actual matching.
3.2 Empirical Evidence
In 2007, the number of open positions, the number of candidates and the number
of applications in every discipline were published by the State department (Table
1). Three main categories were distinguished. In the first category, including Law,
Economics & Management (L&M) disciplines, each candidate applies on average
to 50% of the opened positions. In the other categories, including Science on the one
hand and Literature and Humanities on the other hand (H&S), the number of candi-
dates per position (pressure) is significantly higher and the number of applications
per candidate is significantly lesser. Globally, the hiring process is efficient in the
sense that the recruitment rate is 98%. The local hiring rate, that is the percentage
of universities recruiting candidates who passed their PhD in this same university,
is circa 28% (37% in L&M, 24% in Humanities and 28% in Science).
1 A pre-filter referred to as “qualification” is used to reject PhDs with no teaching experience. This
step is left out of the study for the sake of simplicity.
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Table 1 The French academic labor market in 2007.
2007 Total L&M Hum. Science
Positions 2110 324 695 1000
Candidates 9318 555 3135 5540
Applications/candidate 8,3 26,8 8,8 6,0
HiringRate 98% 94% 99% 99%
LocalHiring rate 28% 37% 24% 28%
nbSections 57 6 25 23
Avg. nbJobs / sect. 37,0 54,0 27,8 43,5
4 Academic Labor Market Modelling
This section describes the Multi-Agent model proposed for the French academic la-
bor market, together with the assumptions made regarding university and candidate
preferences.
4.1 Agent Preferences
It might be safely assumed that universities aim at recruiting the best candidates
while candidates aim at being recruited in the best universities. Usually each agent
has however different quality criteria; and, would it exist, the “true quality” ordering
is unknown.
The proposed modelling will thus proceed in a backward manner, assuming that
there exists such a “true ordering”, of which each agent preference ordering is a
perturbed variant. Only two types of perturbations are considered at the moment,
respectively based on locality preferences and on random noise (see below).
Formally, letting U denote the number of universities, it is assumed with no loss
of generality that the set of universities {u1, . . . ,uU} is ordered according to the “true
ordering”. Symmetrically, C denotes the number of candidates and {c1, . . .cC} the
set of candidates ordered after the “true ordering”.
4.2 Multi-Agent based Model
The MAS involves two types of agents, candidates {c1, . . . ,cC} and universities
{u1, . . . ,uU}, where an agent index stands for its rank after the (unknown) “true
ordering”. Furthermore the model is spatialized, that is, to each agent are associated
2D coordinates (in [0,1]). The home University of an candidate is the nearest one
after the Euclidean distance.
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4.2.1 Candidates
Candidate ci is characterized from five parameters. The first two parameters (in
[0,1]) govern his preference ordering: i) elitism ei stands for his bias toward the
best universities; ii) locality ℓi stands for his bias toward the nearest universities. A
random perturbation, modelled as (1− ei − ℓi)V with V uniformly drawn in [0,1],
accounts for his subjective preferences. Overall, the quality q(i, t) of university ut
for candidate ci is computed as (the lower the better):
q(i, t) = ei ×
t
U
+ ℓi ×d(ci,ut)+(1− ei − ℓi)×V
Three more parameters are used to model the application strategy of candidate ci. A
risk-propensity parameter ri determines whether he rather applies to the top-ranked
universities (according to the preference ordering q(i, ·)), or to the universities best
matching his own rank. Precisely, the strategic ordering of ci is defined as (the lower
the better):
s(i, t) = riq(i, t)+(1− ri)
|i− t|
C
His application strategy is finally defined from the number Ni of positions he will
apply to; ci applies to the top Ni universities after the ordering s(i, t). Independently,
ci applies to his home University with probability hi (empirically, candidates always
apply to their home university).
4.2.2 Universities
Likewise, university ut is characterized from four parameters. The first two parame-
ters (in [0,1]) govern his preference ordering: i) elitism et stands for its bias toward
the best candidates; ii) locality ℓt stands for its bias toward local candidates. Lastly,
a random perturbation modeled as (1− et)V with V uniformly drawn in [0,1], ac-
counts for the “subjective” preferences of university ut . Overall, the quality r(i, t) of
candidate ci for university ut is:
r(i, t) = (et ×
i
C
+(1− et)V )(1− ℓt .δi,t)
where δi,t is 1 iff ci is local to ut and 0 otherwise.
University ut selects the candidates to be interviewed after its risk propensity
rt and a SelfAssessment parameter ot , where ot is positive (respectively negative)
if university ut tends to consider itself less attractive (respectively more attractive)
than it is after the “true” university ordering. More precisely, its strategic ordering
is defined as:
s′(i, t) = rt × r(i, t)+(1− rt)×
|i− (t +ot)|
C
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Two settings, referred to as NoLearning and Learning, are distinguished in the
following. In the NoLearning setting, ot is set to 0. In the Learning setting, ot is
adjusted after each “move” (yearly recruitment). In the case the university did not
recruit its candidate, it lowers its expectation and ot is incremented. Otherwise ot
is decremented with probability α , where α is computed after the empirical hiring
rate2). s
4.2.3 Interaction rules
Every candidate ci applies for the top Ni positions after ordering s(i, ·), where Ni is
uniformly selected in [1,Max.Application], and he applies to his home university
with probability hi.
Every university ut produces a shortlist of 5 names, the top 5 candidates after
ordering s′(·, t)3.
Every candidate ci thereafter ranks the universities having shortlisted him af-
ter the q(i, ·) ordering. Eventually, the candidates and universities preferences are
aggregated by a variant of Stable Marriage algorithm [4], an optimal matching is
derived, and the recruitment decisions are made accordingly.
5 Simulation Results
5.1 Methodology and Experimental settings
The main two efficiency indicators of an ALM are the HiringRate (fraction of po-
sitions fulfilled) and the LocalHiring rate (fraction of positions fulfilled by local
candidates). We further consider the FameLoss of each university, defined as the
difference between the rank of the recruited candidate and its own rank (not ful-
filled positions are not considered).
The key parameters of the MA-based model (number of positions, of candidates
and maximal number of applications per candidate, size of the shortlist) are cal-
ibrated after the empirical evidence presented for the H&S disciplines4 (section
4). The behavioral parameters (elitism, localism, risk-propensity) are set to the so-
2 Formally, α is such that the average hiring rate converges toward the empiric rate ω . At the
equilibrium, the expected increase equals the expected decrease:
1−ω = ω ×α ⇒ α =
1−ω
ω
3 For the sake of simplicity, the impact of the live interviews is not accounted for in the model.
4 The L&M setting corresponds to a saturated market, where almost 50% of the candidates apply
to every job; in this situation a high locality bias is needed to enforce a reasonable hiring rate, as
shown in [3].
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Fig. 1 HiringRate versus University Rank in the NoLearning and Learning cases
Fig. 2 Local Hiring Rate and Nb. of applications vs. university rank in the No-Learning case
called elitist settings (Table 2), studied and validated in [3]. The simulations were
performed using the RePast Framework [10]. All reported results are averaged over
1,000 independent simulations with same parameter setting.
Table 2 Parameter Values in the Simulations
General Candidates Universities
Positions Candidates Max.Application ω ei ℓi ri hi et ℓt rt ot
50 200 20 .97 .7 .1 U[.1; 1] 1 .7 U[0, .2] U[.1;1] 0
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5.2 No learning setting
In the NoLearning case (ot = 0), the results closely match the available ground truth:
HiringRate rate is 97% (vs 94% in empirical data) and Local Hiring rate is 28% (vs
28%). Interestingly, the HiringRate and the average number of received applications
do not vary linearly w.r.t. the university rank. More precisely, four categories of
universities can be distinguished (Fig. 1):
• The Best (Top 8 universities) have a high HiringRate and receive many applica-
tions. The Best universities choose the best candidates, who come. The Local-
Hiring rate is the lowest one (Fig. 2).
• The Good (rank between 9 and 21) have a low HiringRate although they receive
a high number of applications. These universities, in the shadow of the Best ones,
particularly suffer from the limited size of the short list to select the best candi-
dates. While many good candidates apply to the Good universities, if they are
selected they seldom come; they go to the Best universities.
• The Medium (between 22 and 39) have a high HiringRate, despite the fact that
they receive few applications. They interview good risk-adverse candidates and
local candidates. The short-listed candidates (including local candidates) come,
as the Medium universities is the best they can pretend to. Both HiringRate and
LocalHiring rate are high.
• The Bad (between 40 and 50) also receive few applications; they have a low Hir-
ingRate and a very high LocalHiring rate. Like Medium universities, they inter-
view good risk-adverse and local candidates; however their top-listed candidates
are more likely to defect if they can, and the HiringRate therefore decreases.
With respect to the FameLoss criteria, Fig 3 shows two groups of universities
with significantly different behaviors: Best and Good universities recruit the best
candidates they can attract whereas Medium and Bad universities recruit candidates
Fig. 3 Impact of risk-propensity on FameLoss, for Top, Good, Medium and Bad universities in the
NoLearning case
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with a disappointingly low rank. Furthermore, the FameLoss increases with the risk
propensity (Fig. 3). This unexpected phenomena is blamed on the “subjectivity”
effect involved in the preference r(·, t). The more risk-taker the university, the more
it follows its own preference ranking, possibly selecting candidates with low rank
due to subjective or local preferences.
5.3 Learning Universities Setting
In the Learning case, universities are allowed to increase/decrease their SelfAssessment
depending on the success of the past hiring rounds. The results (averaged over 1000
independent runs) are measured after stabilization (1000 time steps). As could have
been expected, learning makes universities more efficient: the HiringRate increases
compared to the NoLearning case (Fig. 1). The SelfAssessment curve (Fig. 4) dis-
plays contrasted situations, mirroring the HiringRate curve (Fig. 1 - NoLearning
case). Roughly speaking, the Best universities tend to overestimate themselves, the
Good ones, to depreciate themselves (in order to anticipate the defection of their
candidates), the Medium ones seemingly have no bias, and the Bad ones underesti-
mate themselves.
The impact of the risk propensity is analyzed wrt the FameLoss, as the Hir-
ingRate does not discriminate among good and bad universities in the Learning
case. Fig. 5 suggests that the risk propensity has no impact on the FameLoss except
for the Best universities, that should rather have a conservative strategy (low risk
propensity).
In the meanwhile, the SelfAssessment parameter features a high impact on the
FameLoss (Fig. 6). If Best universities overestimate themselves, the weight of their
subjective preferences increases, which results in recruiting lower-ranked candidates
Fig. 4 Over and Under assessment of Universities vs Rank (learning setting). Top universities tend
to over-estimate themselves; good and bad universities tend to under-estimate themselves; medium
universities show no bias.
10 Philippe Caillou and Michele Sebag
everything else being equal. Inversely, Good universities should not deprecate them-
selves in order to minimize the Fame loss. Quite the contrary, the Medium and Bad
universities optimize their FameLoss by underestimating themselves.
6 Conclusion
This paper, resuming an earlier work devoted to the inefficiencies of Centralized
Academic Labor Market [3], investigates how universities can increase their hir-
ing rate. The proposed mechanism, relying on the self evaluation of the universi-
ties expectations, duly addresses the market inefficiencies regarding the Hiring rate.
Extensive empirical investigations however suggest that this way of increasing the
hiring rate can entail some undesirable Fame Loss. Specifically, Best and Good uni-
versities should not underestimate (respectively overestimate) themselves in order
to recruit best or good candidates. Quite the contrary, Medium and Bad universities
should deliberately underestimate themselves to secure the recruitment of accept-
able candidates.
Further research will consider more comprehensive learning/optimizing setting
for universities and candidates, allowing them to fine tune their behavioral param-
eters in order to maximize their consolidated Fame for universities, and their job
quality for candidates.
Fig. 5 Impact of risk-propensity on FameLoss, for Top, Good, Medium and Bad universities in the
Learning setting
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